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Balancing Government Regulation Against Access to
Drugs: Address to Seton Hall University
School of Law, February 16, 2007
Daniel Meron ∗
It is a great honor for me to be invited to address this conference and to share my perspective as the General Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services on the issues that you are
discussing today.
Not having any particular personal or institutional expertise in
intellectual property law, the portion of the theme of today’s conference that I will address is the delicate balance between the FDA’s
regulations and approval processes, and public health and drug access concerns. The question that is the theme of today’s conference
is particularly timely for discussion at a legal conference. In the last
few months, two federal court decisions have raised questions about
the FDA’s ability to serve as a gatekeeper over access to drugs in the
market as well as to the propriety of the FDA’s role in making determinations that limit the availability of new drugs to patients.
The first case to which I am referring, of course, is the Abigail Al1
liance decision. As I am sure you are aware, in Abigail Alliance the
D.C. Circuit announced a fundamental un-enumerated right, as part
of substantive due process, “of a mentally competent, terminally ill
adult patient to access potentially life-saving post-Phase I investigational new drugs, upon a doctor’s advice”—that is, a constitutional
right to drugs that the FDA has determined are safe enough to proceed to Phase II clinical trials but that are unapproved and that a
doctor concludes are in the patient’s interests.
I confess that when I first read the decision, my immediate
thought was that it had been too long since I had taken Constitu∗
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tional Law in law school, because I didn’t recall reading the phrase
“post-Phase I clinical trials” in the Constitution, nor, come to think of
it, any mention of the FDA (which I’m sure was a drafting oversight
by our Framers).
In fairness, however, one has to acknowledge that the decision
by the majority in Abigail Alliance appeals—even if it doesn’t expressly
invoke—at least superficially, to principles that lie at the core of the
political philosophy of our founding. Certainly, we all know that
Hobbes and Locke and other similar social contractarians argued
that people have a natural right of self-preservation. Locke went so
far as to call self-preservation a “duty owed to God.” And the drafters
of our Declaration of Independence proclaimed that when “government becomes destructive” of these ends it is the right of a people to
alter or abolish their government. The charge that limiting access to
drugs outside of clinical trials to those drugs that have been approved
by the FDA is violative of a fundamental right of self-preservation is,
to say the least, an explosive one to make.
Upon closer examination, however, I would argue that the reasoning of the panel majority in Abigail Alliance, which closely follows
the arguments made by the Alliance in that case, is philosophically
incoherent. The Abigail Alliance court based its analysis on two main
prongs: the relatively minimal history of drug regulation prior to the
twentieth century (which, incidentally, I believe is somewhat exaggerated), and the common law tradition which recognized a right to act
in self-defense. The panel, however, stopped short of the conclusion
that one might have thought would have logically followed from its
premises: that individuals battling potentially terminal illnesses have a
right to make their own decision about whether to take drugs that
may or may not be effective and that might or might not harm them.
Instead, the panel held only that terminally ill individuals had a “fundamental right” to access drugs that both the FDA has determined
are safe enough to proceed to Phase II clinical trials and that the patients’ doctors had recommended. In other words, the Court accepted that the FDA may—notwithstanding statements in the opinion
suggesting that the decision to take a drug that might save a patient is
an area of personal autonomy that historically has been free of governmental regulation—bar access to unapproved drugs that the FDA
deems not sufficiently safe.
But what, one may ask, is the principled constitutional distinction at work here? Once one accepts the principle that the FDA may
constitutionally serve as a gatekeeper and prohibit provision of drugs
that the FDA determines are not safe enough, what constitutional
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significance is there to the difference between the standards of safety
that the FDA applies in making determinations whether the drug may
proceed to Phase II trials, versus Phase III trials, versus the ultimate
drug approval decision? For that matter, why condition the exercise
of this alleged fundamental right on a doctor’s approval? Fundamental rights are generally understood to be rights to act free of government interference. Defining the very right by reference to an FDA
regulatory scheme makes little sense.
For these reasons, although the Abigail Alliance panel, as well as
the plaintiffs, insisted they were applying a fundamental rights analysis, it seems far more coherent to understand the analysis in Abigail
Alliance as a form of very heightened rational basis or “arbitrary and
capricious” review. In effect, the plaintiffs and the panel majority argued that it is irrational to have a regulatory scheme in which the
FDA makes a determination that a drug is safe enough to be administered in Phase II clinical trials, yet to deny access to those same drugs
to terminally ill persons who do not qualify or were unable to obtain
a spot in the trial.
But under rationality review, this challenge must surely fail as
well. Where there exist strong competing rationales pointing in different directions, the work of reconciling those competing policies
when it comes to the regulation of commercial conduct is surely the
job of regulators, not judges. Here, the FDA has strong interests in
limiting clinical access to drugs that have not yet completed the clinical trial process, and those interests extend well beyond the paternalistic one of trying to protect the safety of patients. For example, patients who agree to participate in a clinical trial have approximately
only a fifty percent chance of actually being administered the drug
being tested; the remainder get either a placebo or an alternative
treatment. Why would patients agree to participate in clinical trials if
they could obtain drugs outside the clinical trial without that fifty
percent risk?
Having said all this, there is much less here than meets the eye,
in at least two respects. First, the FDA already has in place a procedure, now codified in the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, by which
terminally ill patients who wish access to experimental drugs outside
the context of a clinical trial may obtain access to such drugs. In particular, section 561 of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) permits individual patients to obtain access to investigational drugs or
devices if (1) their physician determines that there is no comparable
or satisfactory alternative therapy for the serious disease and that the
risks of the investigational drug or device are comparable to the risks
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of the disease or condition; and (2) the FDA determines that there is
sufficient evidence of safety and effectiveness to support the use and
that the use will not interfere with completion of clinical trials, and
the sponsor submits an appropriate protocol. Section 561 further authorizes widespread access to investigational drugs where the FDA
makes findings that the sponsor is proceeding with clinical trials and
is actively pursuing marketing approval. With respect to individual
patient requests for access to unapproved therapies for terminal or
life-threatening conditions that are unresponsive to available therapy,
the FDA has been quite permissive in its approvals. And while the
FDA’s rules prohibit manufacturers from charging such patients
more than regulatorily defined “direct costs,” that restriction is a perfectly reasonable way of both protecting desperate consumers and
ensuring that manufacturers retain the incentive to pursue approval
through the clinical trial process.
Second, there is of course no guarantee that removal of the prohibition of a manufacturer’s supplying drugs outside the clinical trial
process would in fact result in the manufacturer actually making the
drugs available. This is a point to which I will return later.
The second recent court case, Medical Center Pharmacy v. Gonza2
les, currently on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, squarely raises issues relating to the balancing of FDA regulation and access, challenging the
FDA’s authority to subject drug compounding to the Act’s requirements relating to approval of “new drugs.”
Drug compounding refers to the process by which a pharmacist
or doctor combines, mixes, or alters ingredients to create a medication tailored to the needs of an individual patient. Compounding is
typically used to prepare medications that are not commercially available, such as medication for a patient who is allergic to an ingredient
in a mass-produced product. It is a traditional component of the
practice of pharmacy. Although with the rise of modern manufacturing practices for drugs pharmacy compounding is less widespread, it
is still a component of the practice of pharmacy and is taught as part
of the standard curriculum at most pharmacy schools.
The FDCA, however, requires that the FDA specifically approve
every “new drug” introduced into interstate commerce. The FDCA
defines the term “new drug” as any drug the composition of which is
not generally recognized as safe and effective, and there is little
doubt that compounded drugs clearly fall within this definition and
are therefore subject to the FDA’s jurisdiction. However, were the
2
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FDA to require that every compounded drug be reviewed for safety
and effectiveness, the practice of compounding would be effectively
shut down. For that reason, the FDA traditionally left regulation of
compounding to the states. Pharmacists continued to prepare compounded drugs for specific patients without applying for FDA approval of those drugs.
In the early 1990s, however, the FDA became concerned that
some pharmacists were engaged in large-scale manufacturing under
the guise of compounding, thereby avoiding the FDCA’s new drug
requirements. In 1992, in response to this concern, the FDA issued a
Compliance Policy Guide (CPG) which announced that the FDA
would continue to exercise enforcement discretion with respect to
traditional drug compounding. However, if the manufacturer’s
compounding activities were akin to drug manufacturing, the FDA
would consider enforcement actions.
The FDA’s policy was largely codified by Congress in the Food
and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA),
which contained a statutory exemption for certain drug compound3
ing activities. The FDAMA provisions permitted compounding by a
licensed pharmacist or physician in response to a valid prescription
for an identified individual patient, or, if prepared before the receipt
of such a prescription, in “limited quantities” only. The statute also
prohibited pharmacies from soliciting prescriptions and from advertising the availability of specific compounded drugs. Pharmacists
could advertise their compounding services generally, but not specific
compounded drugs.
These speech restrictions were challenged by a group of pharmacists on First Amendment grounds in Thompson v. Western States
4
Medical Center. The case made its way to the Supreme Court, which
held that the speech provisions in FDAMA were not narrowly tailored
to promote the government’s objectives, and thus unconstitutionally
restricted the speech rights of pharmacists. Interestingly, in that litigation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that not only were
the speech restrictions unconstitutional, but that they could not be
severed from the other provisions of the law relating to compounding. Therefore, according to the Ninth Circuit, the entire compounding section of the statute was invalid. That issue was never appealed to the Supreme Court, and thus the Supreme Court did not
rule on severability.
3
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2001).
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Following the Western States litigation, the FDA has taken the position that the FDAMA provisions relating to compounding are invalid, and has issued a revised compliance policy guide that sets forth
the circumstances under which the FDA will exercise its enforcement
discretion to permit compounding of specific drugs. The FDA’s approach is again based on balancing access and safety—permitting
compounding in limited quantities in response to a specific, valid
prescription from a physician. But when the volume or other circumstances of compounding suggest that the pharmacy is actually acting
as a drug manufacturer, the FDA will consider enforcement actions.
In particular, the FDA’s CPG defines traditional compounding,
which the FDA leaves for the states to regulate, as the “extemporaneous[] compound[ing] and manipulation of reasonable quantities of
human drugs upon receipt of a valid prescription for an individually
5
identified patient from a licensed practitioner.” When considering
potential enforcement actions over drug compounding, the FDA has
stated it would take into account the following: whether the compounding was being conducted with drugs that were withdrawn or
removed from the market for safety reasons; whether compounding
created finished drugs from bulk active ingredients that were not
components of approved drugs; whether the compounding used
commercial scale manufacturing or testing equipment, and similar
indicia of potential harms. In short, we are fully aware that there are
many beneficial instances of compounding, and that it would be bad
policy to prohibit all forms of compounding. The FDA is committed
to making sure that its enforcement guidance is clear enough to
avoid deterring beneficial conduct, while at the same time making
sure that abusive practices involving bulk compounding remain subject to its enforcement.
The district court’s decision in Medical Center Pharmacy throws
much of this conceptual framework into doubt, although the district
court’s injunction did not permit wide-scale compounding in bulk.
The district court concluded that, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s
holding, the majority of section 503A remains valid, and that the
FDCA implicitly excludes compounded drugs from the definition of
“new drugs.” While reasonable people might disagree on the severability issue decided by the Ninth Circuit, I believe that section 503A
actually confirms that Congress intended compounded drugs to qualify as “new drugs,” because otherwise its express exemption of drugs
that are compounded individually under the conditions specified in
5

U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDES MANUAL § 460.200
(2002), http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance_ref/cpg/cpgdrg/cpg460-200.html.
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section 503A from the definition of new drug would have been unnecessary. This case is now on appeal to the Fifth Circuit, and we
hope that the Fifth Circuit will place the task of balancing the competing risks and benefits of compounding back at the FDA—where it
belongs.
Perhaps the most fundamental and visible example of the balance of government regulation and access is the continuing debate
over the speed of drug approval by the FDA and the availability of resources for that purpose. Since 1962, the FDCA has required the
FDA to assess the safety and effectiveness of every new drug before it
may lawfully be distributed in interstate commerce. The statute requires manufacturers to provide the FDA with extensive data demonstrating that the drug is safe and effective and that the product can be
consistently produced within precise specifications. The FDA is required to review all of the data submitted by the manufacturer and
determine whether the product meets the statutory standards for approval. This takes time and resources. For that reason, there has
long been controversy surrounding the length of the FDA’s review
and the resources available to the agency to review applications.
In 1992, for the first time, Congress authorized the FDA to collect fees from drug companies to fund drug reviews. The Prescrip6
tion Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) established a system whereby
manufacturers were required to pay significant fees to the FDA for
the review of both initial applications for the approval of a new drug
and subsequent supplemental applications, such as an application for
an already approved drug to be approved for use in a new indication.
PDUFA was authorized by Congress for five years, and it has been reauthorized twice—in 1997, then again in 2002. PDUFA is up for reauthorization this year, and once again, the debate has centered on
FDA resources, review times for drug applications, and drug safety.
When PDUFA was first enacted in 1992, the focus was speeding
up the review time for drugs. At that time, many felt that the FDA
was not approving new medications fast enough, particularly for diseases such as AIDS and cancer. Accordingly, under the original enactment of PDUFA and subsequent reauthorizations, PDUFA fees
were meant to facilitate and speed drug reviews. Under the law, the
FDA must render a decision on a new drug application within ten
months. The FDA can request additional data or take other actions
to extend the clock on action dates, but generally speaking, PDUFA
has had the effect of dramatically shortening review times for drugs.
6
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In addition, PDUFA mandated that the FDA hire additional staff
dedicated to reviewing applications.
Under current law, PDUFA fees can be dedicated to monitoring
safety issues only for the first three years following approval of a drug.
Clearly, the Congresses that enacted PDUFAs I to III felt that the FDA
was taking too long and erecting too many hurdles to drug availability. Today, the focus is somewhat different. Although facilitating efficient reviews of new drug applications remains a priority, there is a
great deal more attention given to drug safety, and especially to the
resources available to the FDA to engage in post-approval surveillance. Think of Vioxx or Ketek. Accordingly, as part of the discussion over the reauthorization of PDUFA this year, the FDA has proposed that the three-year restriction on use of PDUFA fees for drug
safety monitoring be lifted, and that a significant portion of PDUFA
fees be dedicated to post-market drug safety initiatives.
PDUFA, therefore, illustrates the careful balance that the FDA
and Congress must strike—on one hand, providing speedy access to
needed medications, but on the other hand, ensuring the continued
safety of the U.S. drug supply. How the FDA and Congress strike that
balance can shift over time, and we are currently seeing the pendulum swing towards drug safety.
Of course, no discussion of FDA regulation and drug access
would be complete without some mention of the very public debate
over drug reimportation. That debate goes directly to the question of
the appropriate level of government regulation to balance competing
goals—ensuring the safety of the drug supply and giving consumers
greater access to affordable medications. The disparity of drug costs
in the United States compared to other countries has led many to assert that the government should permit consumers to freely import
drugs from other countries, Canada in particular.
Unfortunately, the debate over re-importation, in my opinion,
has been marred by confusion of terms and misapprehension of the
current legal requirements. Individuals debating the issue often talk
past each other, because they use the same terms to mean very different things.
Of the various types of conduct to which one might refer, only
one is strictly speaking re-importation, which is when a U.S.manufactured drug, approved for sale in the U.S., is exported abroad
and then re-imported back to this country. That is legal today, so
long as it is the original manufacturer who does the re-importation.
But that process does not result in cheaper drugs, and is not what
most people mean when they use the phrase “re-importation.” It is of
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course also legal for persons to import (not re-import) FDA-approved
drugs made for the U.S. market in FDA-inspected foreign facilities—
but again, this process doesn’t result in access to cheap foreign
prices.
Two main categories of importation are currently illegal. One is
the importation of unapproved drugs produced in facilities that the
FDA has not inspected at all. The second, and perhaps the one that
has garnered the most attention on the part of advocates of liberalizing importation rules, involves foreign versions of drugs that are
manufactured in the same facility (although often on a different production line), and by the same manufacturer, as the FDA-approved
drug.
Proponents of liberalizing importation of this latter category of
drugs from Canada helped secure passage of section 804 of the
FDCA. That section, codified at 21 U.S.C. § 384, would allow drug
wholesalers and pharmacists to import prescription drugs from Canada under certain circumstances. However, that section of the statute
is effective only if the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
certifies to Congress that the section’s implementation will “pose no
additional risk to the public’s health and safety” and will “result in a
significant reduction in the cost of covered products to the American
consumer.” To date, no HHS Secretary, going back to the Clinton
Administration, has made such a finding.
Section 804, however, presents something of a legal conundrum.
Even if a Secretary were to make the required finding, section 804
requires that importation only be permitted in accordance with regulations that “require safeguards” that each imported drug comply
with section 505 of the Act (requiring FDA approval of the drugs as
safe and efficacious) as well as with sections 501 and 502, which respectively bar drugs that are adulterated and misbranded. Enforcement of this requirement would virtually make a null set of drugs that
could lawfully be imported from Canada, even if the Secretary were
able to make the requisite certification. Drugs manufactured in Canada for the Canadian (or another foreign country’s) market would
not be packaged with U.S.-approved labeling, and would often not be
produced on the FDA-approved and inspected manufacturing lines.
Such drugs will, therefore, not be approved under section 505 (which
requires approval of the labeling and production facilities), they will
almost always be misbranded, and the lack of FDA inspections would
make it impossible for the FDA to create safeguards that the drugs
are not adulterated as defined by law. Although policy debaters often
talk about modifying U.S. policy to allow importation of foreign ver-
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sions of “FDA-approved” drugs, drugs manufactured for foreign markets are almost necessarily not FDA-approved, and the FDA cannot
provide assurances as to their safety.
Conventional wisdom holds that FDA regulation has an inverse
relationship with access to drugs—greater regulation reduces the
availability and access to drugs. Up to now, I have focused on aspects
of the U.S. regulatory system that might be consistent with that premise. But there is one very important context in which the conventional wisdom does not always hold, and in which FDA regulation
may serve to increase access to drugs.
The FDA is not the only entity that establishes requirements pertaining to the design and labeling of drugs. The common law tort
regime, usually implemented by lay juries, imposes its own form of after the fact “review” of the safety of drugs and of the accuracy of labels. Although prior Supreme Court decisions questioned this, the
7
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bates firmly recognized that
awards under the common law impose “requirements” on manufacturers, as that term is used in many express preemption clauses. It is
often argued that the threat of large damage awards diminishes the
willingness of manufacturers to introduce certain categories of drugs
to the market and increases the prices of those drugs that are introduced.
By removing the threat of inconsistent and burdensome state
regulatory requirements that might otherwise apply to drugs, preemption works to increase access to prescription drugs. Were states
to impose their own requirements on drugs, manufacturers would be
required to comply with fifty different regulatory systems. This could
mean substantially different versions of the labeling to be distributed
with drugs, or even different methods of manufacturing the product
in order to comply with state requirements. Were this to happen,
manufacturers would face potentially prohibitive costs, and, in the extreme, could face a situation where they could not comply with both
state and federal law. By operation of the preemption doctrine, the
FDA’s regulatory requirements serve to remove inconsistent state requirements and establish a uniform national standard, thereby enhancing the availability and access of these products.
But the preemptive effect of FDA regulation is directly correlated to its intrusiveness. Where the FDA regulatory process includes
detailed review and approval of specific designs and particular wording on labels, a process that is deliberate, methodical and time7
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consuming, courts have generally agreed that contrary state law tort
verdicts are preempted. But where the FDA process has been streamlined, preemption is far less likely to be found. A stark demonstra8
tion of this is in the medical device context. In Medtronic v. Lohr, the
Supreme Court held that the streamlined “substantial equivalence”
501k determination that the FDA makes in approving devices did not
create federal requirements of preemptive effect. Yet, even after
Lohr, six of the seven Circuits that have considered the question have
concluded that the slower but much more rigorous pre-market approval process for devices did preempt state law defective design and
9
misleading labeling claims. This is thus one area where increased
FDA regulation can actually lead to greater access to more affordable
therapies.
This last point brings us back full circle to Abigail Alliance. Even
removal of the prohibition on access to experimental drugs would
not impose any requirement that manufacturers actually make such
experimental drugs available to patients. In fact, there is substantial
reason to believe that manufacturers might not make their drugs
available to patients outside the confines of clinical trials. Experimental unapproved drugs, by definition, have not been found safe
and effective by the FDA, and thus the FDCA would not generally
preempt tort claims against manufacturers by individuals injured by
these drugs. Although manufacturers would undoubtedly try to limit
sales to those who sign express and broad releases, their exposure in
tort might very well have limited the practical effect the Abigail Alliance decision would have had.

8

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve this circuit split. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 75
U.S.L.W. 3690 (U.S. June 25, 2007) (No. 06-179).
9

